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Basis of Liability for Blasting in Virginia
WmLAM T. MusE
In this period of prosperity more private capital is avail-
able for construction of all kinds. Also, vast sums of public
funds are being appropriated for all types of construction,
particularly highway construction. For example, the National
System of Interstate and Defense Highways alone will involve
the construction of 41,000 miles of highway, and is designed
to connect and serve all major urban centers in the United
,States. It is probably the largest peacetime engineering
project ever undertaken by man. An estimated three-fourths
of a million parcels of land, approximately 1,500,000 acres,
will be condemned for highway right-of-way over the fifteen-
year construction period. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce,
Bureau of Public iRoads, Manual for Highway Serverance
Studies 1, 1960.
Approximately twice the amount of property will be needed
for other federal-aid highway systems. In addition to the
new Interstate System, there exists the ABC program of
federal aid for the improvement of highways and streets by
states; it comprises a primary system of major routes and a
secondary system of feeder roads together with their urban
connections. U. S. Dep't. of Commerce, Release No. Q61-176,
Oct. 10, 1961.
Increased activity in construction of highways, buildings
and other projects means increased use of blasting opera-
tions. More instances of injury to person and damage to
property are the natural consequence. When actions are
brought for these injuries and damages in the Virginia
courts, what should be the basis of liability?
In other American jurisdictions the courts are unanimous
in holding that blasting results in strict liability without
proof of negligence when tangible objects are thrown upon
the plaintiff's land or where they strike his person. Where
the damage is the result merely of concussion or vibration,
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some few courts continue to adhere to the ancient procedural
distinction between trespass and case, and regard the injury
as an "indirect" one, for which case has to be brought, and
no recovery can be had except on the basis of negligence.
This distinction, however, is rejected by the great majority
of the courts and by the text authorities.
There are only three reported Virginia cases involving
blasting. The earliest case is Simmons and Winch v. McCon-
nell, 86 Va. 494 (1890). Defendants, operators of a rock
quarry, fired a blast which threw a fragment of stone weigh-
ing some twenty-five pounds onto the yard of 0 striking and
killing the plaintiff's intestate who was a social visitor in 0's
yard. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed on
appeal. The basis of the defendants' liability is not entirely
clear. From a study of the record and briefs on appeal, it
would appear that the case was submitted to the jury on the
theory of negligence and that negligence was found by the
jury to be present.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals devotes one paragraph
to the issue of whether liability in blasting cases is founded
on strict liability or on a finding of negligence. There are
five citations of authority. Three of these are not in point, and
are of no help in resolving this issue. Thompson, Negligence
(1880) 113 deals with the problem but is not conclusive.
The only decisive authority cited is Colton v. Onderdonk,
69 Cal. 155, 10 P. 395 (1886) which has been a leading
American case for the past seventy-five years. With apparent
approval of the holding in that case, the Virginia court said:
Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 California, 155, says that
blasting on a lot contiguous to another is an unreason-
able, unusual and unnatural use of property, which no
care or diligence can excuse from actual damages; and
that the defendant was mistaken in supposing that, if
he used care and skill, he had a right to do an act which
was intrinsically dangerous, and would, necessarily,
probably, or naturally, result in damages. 86 Va. 494,
499.
BASIS OF LIABILITY FOR BLASTING IN VIRGINIA 297
At this point in the opinion one would conclude that the
Virginia court had adopted the rule of strict liability, which
is the unanimous view elsewhere. However, the court con-
tinued:
A simple and inexpensive device, easily handled, and
which had been previously used by Welch, their prede-
cessor, would have saved Mrs. McConnell's life. All that
defendants need to have done was to cover the blast
with some timbers. 86 Va. 494, 499.
This last statement would indicate that the court had
adopted the view requiring the proof of negligence. These
two statements, however, are not necessarily in conflict. Per-
haps the court felt that strict liability should be the rule but,
since the defendants were obviously negligent, a fortiori the
finding of liability should be affirmed. The court might have
had this in mind when it stated that the instructions given
were "in the most favorable light for the defendants". While
negligence was present in this case, it may be noteworthy
that nowhere did the court say negligence was necessary.
This question was not again presented to the Court of Ap-
peals until sixty-four years later in Pope v. Overbay, 196 Va.
288, 83 S.E. 2d 365 (1954). Plaintiff alleged that damage had
been caused to his buildings by vibrations set up by defend-
ant's blasting operations in his nearby quarry. The defendant
denied that the alleged damage resulted from the blasting in
his quarry. The trial court submitted the case to the jury
under an instruction of strict liability. The jury found for
the defendant. The Court of Appeals agreed that:
It was for the jury to say, in the light of all the
evidence, whether the damage of which the plaintiff
complains was attributable to vibrations from the de-
fendant's blasting operations. Having decided the clear-
cut issue in favor of the defendant, their verdict should
not [be] disturbed. 196 Va. 288, 294, 83 S.E. 2d. 365, 368.
Having disposed of the case on the factual issue of causation,
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the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to pass on the
correctness of the trial court's instruction on strict liability.
Thus, the uncertainty of the earlier case continued.
The most recent case involving liability for blasting came
before the court in Young and Sons v. Kirk, 202 Va. 176, 116
S.E. 2d 38 (1960). Again, damage to buildings was claimed
as a result of vibrations set up by blasting operations. The
plaintiff had deeded a part of his land to the state for high-
way construction and the deed of conveyance also "released
all claims for damage incurred in construction of the highway
except that caused by negligence". 202 Va. 176, 181, 116 S.E.
2d 38, 42. The trial court, therefore, properly instructed the
jury that proof of negligence was essential to plaintiff's re-
covery. On appeal the court recognized the conflict in decisions
as to whether or not liability may be imposed for damage
caused by vibrations from blasting irrespective of negligence,
and then, giving as a reason the release provisions of the
deed, the court said:
Here we need not and do not determine whether lia-
bility for damages resulting from blasting may be in-
curred irrespective of negligence. 202 Va. 176, 181, 116
S.E. 2d 38, 42.
Of course, this case does not hold that liability in blasting
cases is based on negligence rather than on strict liability.
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the allegation of negligence.
Simmons and Winch has not been overruled by or cited in
any subsequent blasting case though it was cited in the briefs
of counsel in both Pope and Young and Sons. The basis of
liability for injury or damage caused by blasting seems to be
an open question in Virginia. How should the court decide
between the competing views when the next case arises? It
should adopt the rule of strict liability,-if that is not
already the Virginia law. The writer submits that, on au-
thority and reason, the rule of strict liability is the better
view, and that it should be applied where the injury or dam-
age is caused by vibrations as well as by tangible objects.
